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Focused Discussion Invited Paper
Quo Vadis Selective Scientific Realism?
Peter Vickers*
Where is selective scientific realism going? A very large number of
historical challenges are out there in the literature (see e.g., the list of twenty
cases in Vickers 2013) apparently showing in concrete terms how scientific
success actually can be born of hypotheses that are not even approximately
true (on any reasonable account of “approximate truth”). In the years since
Laudan’s “Confutation of Convergent Realism” (1981) the scientific realist
has introduced a whole host of criteria to try to dodge the “counterexamples,”
or at least to reduce the number of them. But when one looks at the historical
challenges, and especially the newer ones that are sensitive to contemporary
selective realism, one might feel that the realist is on the back foot (to put
it mildly). Indeed, many in the community tend to think that the historical
challenges are overwhelming, such that the realist will only manage to dodge
them if she turns realism into an empty position, or if she adds auxiliaries in
an ad hoc manner to save what is in fact a degenerating research program.
By contrast, my current opinion is that the selective realist is in
a strong position vis-à-vis the historical challenges. Certainly the realist
needs to invoke some careful criteria for realist commitment, and various
nuances concerning the nature of her epistemic commitment, and this may
raise the “death by a thousand qualifications” question mark. But the
concern is unfounded: the qualifications are all independently motivated, and
indeed necessary given the philosophical complexity. Qualifications are to be
welcomed here; often the truth is far from simple!
To illustrate, let’s start with a list of some of the most serious historical
challenges that feature in the contemporary literature:
1. Successful explanations and predictions based on the caloric theory of
heat.
2. Successful explanations and predictions based on the phlogiston theory
of combustion.
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3. Successful explanations and predictions based on the Fresnel
“luminiferous ether” theory of light.
4. Successful explanations and predictions based on Kirchhoff’s theory of
the diffraction of light.
5. Successful explanations and superb predictions based on Sommerfeld’s
1916 theory of the hydrogen atom.
6. Dirac’s highly significant prediction of the positron based on the “Dirac
sea” theory of negative energy electrons.
These examples are all chosen because they were extremely successful,
so the realist cannot hope to answer them by raising the bar for the success
necessary for a realist commitment. But what of making a distinction between
the “working parts” of the theory, which are confirmed by the success
because of the special role they play in bringing about the success, and
the “idle wheels” of the theory, which are not so confirmed? This selective
approach to confirmation is independently motivated, has wide appeal, and
has been applied to at least some of the cases (1)-(6) to answer the historical
threat. Just to give three relatively recent examples, Votsis and Schurz (2012)
apply this approach to the caloric theory, Ladyman (2011) applies it to the
phlogiston theory, and Cordero (2011) applies it to Fresnel’s theory of light.
Granted, in each of these cases the application of the selective strategy varies.
But this should cause no concern if we accept a “neutral” approach to the type
of theoretical entity that can be confirmed (see Peters 2014): in some contexts
it might be right that only abstract “structure” is confirmed, but in other
contexts laws, or entities, or some mixture of things might be confirmed.
What really matters is that the realist has good reasons for “selecting”
the parts that are confirmed, reasons that are completely independent of
the fact that those parts were (at least approximately) retained in the
successor theory/theories. Of course, contemporary realists are sensitive to
this requirement, and argue that they do indeed have independent reasons.
What of cases (4), (5), and (6)? Case (4) initially seemed to me to be a
serious challenge to the realist, but after further investigation (see Vickers
2016) I have come around to the idea that the realist has a good response
here (based, again, on thinking about what is really doing the work to
bring about the success). Similarly case (5), on first view, seems extremely
challenging to the realist (see Vickers 2012) and I have seen this case put
forward at conferences and workshops as the knock-down counterexample to
the realist’s success-to-truth inference. However, it turns out that physicists
were themselves long perplexed by this case, and one physicist in particular
worked to resolve the puzzle. His conclusion—comparing the old Sommerfeld
derivation of the success to the contemporary derivation—is that “The
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underlying symmetry of the problem intervenes in a most remarkable and
essential way so as to produce the closest possible correspondence between
the two (suitably formulated) calculations” (Biedenharn 1983, 14, original
emphasis). There is some philosophical work to be done here, but this
strongly suggests just the sort of structural correspondence between the old
and the new theory that would be expected by a structural realist.
That leaves case (6), and, to my knowledge, there is currently no realist
response to the challenge. However, the challenge has been put to the realist
only quite recently (Pashby 2012), so it is a bit too soon to make a confident
judgement. And in addition, this is only one case. Even non-realists such as
Chang insist that “[o]ne case, of course, does not have much force” (2003,
910). And one might well wonder whether it would be a really serious
challenge to the realist even if there are two or three “counterexamples”
to the claim that the working parts of a sufficiently successful theory must
be (at least approximately) true. In particular it is crucial to stress that no
contemporary realist actually insists that such working parts must be true;
instead the claim is that it is a good bet, and “counterexamples” are likely
to be rare. It is acknowledged that realists have a challenge cashing out the
probability judgement they are making here (e.g., Magnus and Callender
2004), but the basic intuition seems to make sense and realist responses to
the “base rate” objection are emerging (e.g., Henderson 2017).
Where does this leave us? I am suggesting that cases (1)-(6) are the
six most serious historical challenges to scientific realism in the literature,
and that contemporary realists currently have answers to five of them that
look promising, or at the very least are worth pursuing. So if the historical
challenge is supposed to be a pessimistic induction, the realist is in a strong
position since the inductive base looks rather weak. But if it is not an
induction, then it seems to miss the mark, since the realist proposes a
defeasible success-to-truth inference that will survive one or two historical
counter-instances. For me, then, contemporary selective scientific realism is
a progressive research program, and this is a progressive and fascinating
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